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TOUGH LOVE: THE EMERGENCE OF
CRIMINAL STATUTES AND DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS AGAINST MANAGED CARE PLANS
FOR INADEQUATE CARE
Brian Wilson*
"The courts should be used to redress harms and not as a vehicle
to change the system. ,y
INTRODUCTION
The ascent of managed care organizations (MCO)2 since the enactment
of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974' is
* Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy;
LL.M. 2001, George Washington University; J.D. 1988, University of Florida; B.S.
1984, Florida State University. The author wishes to thank Professor Sara
Rosenbaum for her guidance and assistance. The author would also like to thank
Phyllis, Miranda, and Jake for their support. The author's email address is
brianstwilson@hotmail.com.
1. Former U.S. Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh, commenting about
managed care reform efforts, The HMO Dilemma, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000,
available at http://www.aetna.com/legal-issues/saying/hmodilemma.htm.
2. The terms "managed care organization," "health maintenance
organization," "preferred provider organization" and "exclusive provider
organization" are used interchangeably in this paper and abbreviated by the term
"MCO." Together they are defined as:
[Ajny health coverage arrangement in which, for a pre-set fee (i.e. the
premium), a company sells a defined package of benefits to a purchaser,
with services furnished to enrolled members through a network of
participating providers who operate under written contractual or
employment agreements, and whose selection and authority to furnish
covered benefits is controlled by the managed care company.
RAND. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 551-
52 (1997).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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well documented . ERISA, on the whole, has proved enormously
confusing in the context of what legislation a state may enact and what
issues may properly be brought against MCOs in a state court . State and
federal courts and legislators have struggled with the general question of
MCO accountability, specifically the bounds of MCO tort liability.6 There
4. See THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, HEALTH
POLICY RESEARCH, NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A NATIONWIDE
STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
(discussing the movement toward managed care) (on file with author); Managed
Care On-Line, Inc., Managed Care Fact Sheets 2000, at
http://www.mcareol.com/factsheets/mcolfact.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001)
(providing data demonstrating that MCOs provide health care to over 150 million
people). See also Mary Dubois Krohn, The False Claims Act and Managed Care:
Blowing the Whistle on Underutilization, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 443 (1997/1998); E.
Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical
Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939 (1999).
5. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 424 (2000) (noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court has decided almost twenty such cases).
6. Two Pennsylvania cases wrestled with the question of when and if tort
charges can be brought against an MCO. The Pappas cases highlight the
uncertainty over exactly what charges can be brought or even if a plaintiff can
bring suit against an MCO for punitive damages in state court related to MCO
conduct. Pappas I dealt with a charge of negligence against an MCO for delaying
medical care for a plaintiff where the delay is alleged to have caused permanent
quadriplegia. Pappas v. Asbel, 555 Pa. 342 (1998). Later, in U.S. Health Care
Systems of Penn. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000), the Supreme Court
vacated the court's decision in Pappas I and allowed a state action to proceed
against the MCO for negligence in light of Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
In Pappas II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again held that ERISA does not
preempt state law where the defendant makes a "mixed eligibility and treatment
decision." Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1096 (Pa. 2001). See also Dukes v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 358 (3d Cir. 1995) (declining to preempt a state
malpractice action when the issue is quality not quantity of care); Wickline v.
California, 92 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1987) (holding that a treating physician is
ultimately responsible for determining whether something is medically necessary
for a patient). But see Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 274 (3d
Cir. 2001) (holding a delay in service claim is preempted by ERISA because a
"delay in limiting benefits [is] conduct that falls squarely within [an MCO's]
administrative function"); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, 965 F.2d 1321. 1339
(5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the state tort action was preempted by federal statute
even though the result is no meaningful remedy for an injured plaintiff).
The lawfulness of state legislation was recently litigated in Corporation Health v.
Texas Department of Insurance, 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed,
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is a slow and uneven trend toward allowing civil actions against MCOs.7
Several of these cases and other well-publicized instances of treatment
denial decisions have served as catalysts for demanding even greater
MCO accountability.8 This demand has led to dramatic movement in
69 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2000) (No. 00-665); Moran v. Rush, 230 F.3d 959
(7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. June 29, 2000) (No. 00-1021).
As of 1999, more than twenty states introduced or enacted bills regarding
guidelines for external appeals of MCO treatment denial decisions or defined the
term "appropriate and medically necessary care." Anne Cramer & Erin O'Brien
Ide, Health Care Law: The Evolution of Consumer Rights Against Health Plans:
External Appeal Process Mandates, 25 VT. B. J. 45 (1999); MOLLY STAUFFER, MED.
NECESSITY, HEALTH POL'Y TRACKING SERVICE (May 27, 1999) (on file with
author).
7. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350 (holding that federal preemption was not
mandated when an MCO practices medicine rather than just making a coverage
determination, and the issue is quality); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois,
730 N.E. 2d 1119, 1132 (Ill. 2000) (holding that a HMO could be liable under the
theory of corporate/institutional negligence if it does not meet the standard of the
"reasonably careful HMO under the circumstances"); Herrera v. Lovelace Health
Systems, Inc. 35 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (D.N.M. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff's
claims against his MCO were not completely preempted because they were claims
over medical services and not over the approval or withholding of benefits under
the plan). However, MCOs still obtain some tort protection if the issue is framed
as a coverage or eligibility decision as opposed to a treatment or mixed eligibility-
treatment decision. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228; Danca v. Private Health Care
System, 185 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1999)(stating in footnote 10 that "[W]e recognize
that the practical result of our decision is that no significant state or federal
remedy exists for plan participants injured by the negligence of utilization review
firms and insurers making quasi-medical decisions in the course of processing
claims for payments and benefits."); Pryzbowski, 245 U.S. at 275 (stating that
"[w]e are not unaware that our holding may leave [the plaintiff], and other
beneficiaries, without effective relief for the improper administration of
benefits"). For a general discussion on the uneven trend toward allowing civil
actions against MCOs see Robert Pear, Series of Rulings Eases Constraints on
Suing H.M.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1999, at Al; Jason A. Glodt, Watch Out
HMOs: The Future of Patients' Rights Will Soon Be Determined, 45 S.D. L. REV.
640 (1999/2000); David L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today: Laws, Cases,
Theories, and Current Issues, 33 J. HEALTH L. 191 (2000).
8. For example, after being denied treatment for AIDs by an MCO, Daniel
Jones held up a banner stating, "HMOs are in it for the money," before setting
himself on fire and dramatically shooting himself on a Los Angeles Freeway. See
Daryl Kelley, The HMO Backlash, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1998, at B3; Heather
Lourie, et al., Freeway Suicide Televised, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, May 1,
2001]
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legal actions and legislation against MCOs for conduct related to
improper medical decisions or the underutilization or denial of medically
necessary care that results in patient harm. ° In responding to this trend,
however, it is imperative that legislators establish a uniform national
standard for determining medical necessity, and address whether there
should be a state-imposed minimum level of care.
Three cases highlight the new legal repercussions confronting managed
care: Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners," United States v. NHC
1998. A study of four thousand heart attack patients concluded that patients
enrolled in MCOs were twice as likely to die after a heart attack than those
enrolled in fee-for-service health plans. Heart Attack Death Rate Higher in
HMOs, at http://www.hmopage.org/higher.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2001) (citing
News and Trends: Are HMOs Trouble for Cardiac Patients?, BUSINESS & HEALTH
(Dec. 1997)). For more information about the health threat posed by managed
care, see JAMIE COURT & FRANCIS SMITH, MAKING A KILLING: HMOs AND THE
THREAT TO YOUR HEALTH (1999); DOROTHY CANCILLA, DEATH BY HMO, THE
JENNIFER GIGLIELLO STORY (1999); BARBARA JOHANNA JANESICK & KAREN L.
GOLDSMITH, MANAGED DYING: HMO SURVIVAL GUIDE (2000); Eleanor D.
Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 Am. J.
L. Med. 335 (2000).
9. See Krohn, supra note 4 at 446.
Underutilization can take many forms. Providers may cut corners or start
viewing as elective those treatments that were previously considered
necessary[,] delay or omit diagnostic tests or therapeutic procedures, or
assume responsibility for care that should be referred to more expert and
more expensive specialists... [or] by making patients wait long periods of
time for appointments or by becoming inaccessible.
Id.
10. See Jeffrey E. Shuren, Legal Accountability for Utilization Review in
ERISA Health Plans, 77 N.C. L. REV. 731, 748 (1999) (stating that "[l]eaving the
judiciary with the task of determining what duties apply to UROs [utilization
review organizations] and third-party payers places an inappropriate burden on
the courts to resolve the tension between the goal of containing costs and the goal
of the tort system to compensate harmed individuals"); Patient's Rights Advocates
Poised to Try Yet Again, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/02/06/congress.hmos.ap/index.ht
ml (Feb 6, 2001) (discussing the latest proposals as the managed care reform
debate continued into a fifth year); Harris Meyer, Fraud Storm Surges Towards
HMOs, HoSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Feb. 20, 1998, at 28 (noting the increase in
fraud prosecutions in health care).
11. Murphy v. Board of Medical Examiners, 949 P.2d 530, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997).
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Healthcare" and United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric
Centers of Oklahoma.3 A New Mexico criminal statute14 and a proposed
Maryland statute15 also highlight the trend in successful legal actions
against MCOs.
In Murphy, the Arizona State Board of Medical Examiners (BOMEX)
formally admonished an MCO medical director for making anS 16
"inappropriate medical decision" regarding medical necessity. The
Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed BOMEX's jurisdiction and
admonition by holding that utilization review (UR) decisions that could
affect the "health or safety of a patient or the public" are appropriate
matters for review by the State board .
In 1997, New Mexico passed a criminal Medicaid fraud statute
prohibiting "treatment that is substantially inadequate when compared to
generally recognized standards within the discipline or industry."'8  In
April 2001, the Maryland State Senate approved an unprecedented statute
that would subject MCO directors to fines or license revocation for faulty
medical necessity decisions that harm a patient.19
Underutilization claims involving Medicare/Medicaid patients have also
been prosecuted under the False Claims Act (FCA) as fraud against the
United States. FCA prosecutions are based on charges that Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement claims submitted to the government by a
12. United States v. NHC Healthcare, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
13. United Statess ex rel. Aranda v. Comty. Centers of Okla., 945 F. Supp.
1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
14. N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-44-7 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1997).
15. S.R. 34, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). See also Eric Kelderman, Bill
to Make HMO Directors Liable for Denying Coverage, CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 9, 2001.
16. Murphy, 949 P.2d at 441.
17. Id.
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-44-7 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1997).
19. S.B. 34, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). On April 3, 2001, the bill
received an unfavorable report from the House Environmental Matters and
Economic Matters Committees, and appears stalled. See Status Report, at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2001rs/billfile/SB0034.htm (last visited Dec 18, 2001).
Previous attempts to pass a similar bill have failed. See Avram Goldstein &
Charles Babington, Maryland Senate Kills Tough HMO Bill, WASH. POST, Mar.
27, 1998, at Al.
20. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 287, 31 U.S.C. §§
3729-33 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
20011
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medical provider are false or fraudulent.21 NHC Healthcare and Aranda
(both of which included claims under the FCA) underscore the damaging
effect of underutilization or inadequate care and the extent to which some
prosecutors will go to redress those injuries.22 In NHC Healthcare, the
prosecution asserted that the nursing facility patients "were in
unnecessary pain ... not given care up to the standards required under the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, and ultimately died because of this
care."
23
The Aranda court noted, "providers must assure that patient services
'will be of a quality which meets professionally recognized standards of
health care."' 24 Consequently, failure to provide patient care that meets
those standards can open a facility to claims under the FCA. One legal
commentator wrote, "[t]he theory behind managed care fraud is simple:
plans and providers say they'll provide all medically necessary care and
are paid up front to do so. If there is a scheme that results in denial of
appropriate care, the government and beneficiaries have been
defrauded." 25
Previously, consumer protection from health care misconduct was the
domain of tort action in addition to state and federal legislation.16 Current
state-enacted legislation includes the creation of a binding appeals system
for MCO subscribers to contest treatment denial decisions; the direction
of managed care health plans to cover certain conditions; and the
direction to provide alcoholism treatment, mammography screening and
forty-eight hour hospital stays for maternity patients.
27
21. Amy Schofield & Linda D. Weaver, Health Care Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 617, 622-24 (2000).
22. Meyer, supra note 10, at 28. See also C.R. Frost & D.H. Beck, Managed
Care Fraud and Abuse Under Fire, MANAGED CARE BRIEFINGS (1999), available
at http://www.sdma.com/images/managed.html (stating that "claims submitted to
the government for payment for coverage extended to managed care enrollees are
generally viewed as necessarily including an implied warranty that all covered
'medically necessary' services were or will be rendered").
23. United States v. NHC Healthcare, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (W.D. Mo.
2000).
24. United States ex rel. Aranda v. Comty. Centers of Okla., 945 F. Supp.
1485, 1488 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
25. Meyer, supra note 10, at 28.
26. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 5.
27. Id. supra note 5, at 474. Some of the state provisions, which number in
excess of 1,260, include mandated provider statutes, mandated benefit provisions,
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There is no consensus over whether MCO misconduct warrants
punitive action. Still, there is certainly a compelling state interest in
ensuring health care is provided&8  Accordingly, any MCO reform
involving criminal penalties must consider, in addition to the legal issues,
the nature of health care and the effect of legislation on health coverage.
When considering criminal penalties, prosecutors and legislators should
look at the danger posed to society, the deterrence value and the
importance and impact of moral retribution. 9 "The criteria of criminal
responsibility also provide a laboratory for testing sensibilities of moral
right and wrong."' The imposition of criminal penalties against MCOs
may be the ultimate legislative and prosecutorial acknowledgment that
"[tihe current systems for tapping and resolving consumer concerns are
uncoordinated, inaccessible, inequitable,... non-conclusive,"31  and
inadequate.
It could be argued that the state is now reliant on MCOS and would not
be able to provide appropriate health care in their absence. Accordingly,
with the number of uninsured at nearly 40 million, any legislation must
consider the financial ramifications on health care plans."
The difficulty, as with any legislation, is finding the right balance to
ensure that comprehensive, affordable and accessible health care is being
provided along with appropriate accountability for MCO misconduct.
MCO advocates assert that if legislative mandates become too
burdensome and costly, the ability of MCOs to remain profitable, or even
exist, could be jeopardized.33 For an industry that has already survived
mandated renewal provisions and mandated coverage for certain people. Id.
28. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association of Health Plans, Pegram v.
Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), [hereinafter Amicus Brief] available at
http://www.medill.nwu.edu/docket/98-1949amicus.html.
29. Steven L. Humphreys, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting The
Corporate Polluter As a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 311, 354
(1990).
30. George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 275, 287 (1998).
31. Kinney, supra note 8, at 380.
32. See ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov./prod/2001pubs/p60-215.pdf (issued Sept. 2001).
33. Amicus Brief, supra note 28. See also Bill Brubaker, Aetna's Unmet
Claims, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at H1. Brubaker quotes Stuart Steeles,
President of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, who compared an
2001]
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staggering cost increases, any added financial pressures could be
disastrous for millions of Americans who rely on MCOs for health
34
coverage.
However, in instances of egregious MCO negligence and reckless
mishandling of grave health care situations, many believe the increase in
criminal prosecutions is appropriate and warranted.35  In part, this is
because certain wrongful decisions to deny treatment may be so violative
of societal norms, so contrary to acceptable morals and values, that no
other mechanism for punishment seems appropriate.
36
While the status of corporate criminal liability is controversial and
unsettled, criminal statutes against MCOs are appealing because MCO
misconduct has the ability to inflict tremendous pain and injury, both in
terms of human suffering and financial loss.37 Additionally, because the
current tort and regulatory penalties apparently have not chilled MCO
misconduct, legislators and prosecutors are looking to criminal
prosecutions to vindicate state interests in the delivery of health care and
the protection of citizens." Moreover, criminal penalties only address
HMO
to an airline that's filling its empty seats at deeply discounted fares. You
only need to look at what's happening to the deterioration of airline
service.., cramming as many people into these seats as we can. I think
most of us would agree that flying today is no pleasure. If we continue to
spiral downward, patients are going to start feeling like airline passengers
at La Guardia Airport.
Id. See also Jonathan P. Weiner, Stop Blaming HMOs, BALT. SUN, July 21, 2000,
at 23A.
34. Amicus Brief, supra note 28.
35. Humphreys, supra note 29, at 351-53. Humphreys' discussion of the
social, policy, and legal implications of environmental criminal penalties has many
parallel concepts and arguments with health care.
36. Id. at 351-53.
37. Id. at 353.
38. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (affirming the right of
a state to require physicians to be licensed or else face criminal misdemeanor
charges). The court said:
Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to
enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and
mysterious influences upon which health and life depend, and requires
not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral
substances, but of the human body in all its complicated parts, and their
relation to each other, as well as their influence upon the mind.
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specific instances of concrete harm without directing how MCOs structure
their company or whether MCO financial incentives should continue. Nor
do they prevent MCOs from attaining as much profit as they can legally
reap. Furthermore, because criminal statutes are designed to prevent
harm, address culpability and deter proscribed behavior, they are now
being viewed as an entirely appropriate supplement to existing tort and
civil remedies to ensure MCO accountability.3 9
MCOs are currently accountable under tort law, state-ordered
mandates and possibly through criminal sanctions. The recent
development of prosecutions and administrative actions against MCOs for
underutilization evinces a growing recognition that civil actions and state-
ordered mandates may not be enough to protect state interests.4 This is
in contrast to the legal focus of fee-for-service (FFS). FFS provided
medicine focuses on overutilization and physicians who perform
unnecessary or unsuccessful operations, versus the traditional health
coverage of quality, cost and access. This transformation from concern
over providing excessive care to concern over receiving coverage
underscores the dominant market presence and strength of MCOs in
Id. See also McCoy v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 391 A.2d 723, 729 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978) (affirming the right of a state to require physician licensing);
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations be Held
Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239 (2000).
39. Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The
Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487
(1996).
40. See generally United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric
Centers of Oklahoma, 945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996); U.S. v. NHC
Healthcare, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Mo. 2000), N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-44-7
(Michie 1978 & Supp. 1997); S.B. 34, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). Also see
Senator Edward Kennedy's (D-MA) comments about managed care, which are
instructive even though they are in a patients' rights context: "We face a crisis of
confidence in health care. -And the issue is not just confidence. It goes to the
heart of the issue of quality care and to the fundamental doctor-patient
relationship." Democrats Introduce "Patients' Bill of Rights," 12 FED. & STATE
INS. WK., Apr. 6, 1998, available at 1998 WL 12754852.
41. See Aranda, 945 F. Supp. 1485. Note that fee-for-service is still an integral
part of Medicare and Medicaid provided medicine today. However, in traditional
employer's health care plans, FFS is virtually nonexistent, having been replaced
with managed care provided health care. Krohn, supra note 4, at 472.
20011
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American health care.42
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Pegram v. Hedrich,3 legislators
may ultimately have to make the difficult assessment of the value and
utility of MCOs.44 In the context of criminal penalties, legislators must re-
evaluate the benefits of managed health care. Specifically, in drafting
criminal legislation, lawmakers must determine if the harm resulting from
willful or negligent misconduct should be excused.45
Currently, criminal actions could proceed against MCOs for certain
misconduct based on existing statutes and common law offenses.
However, to effectively prosecute MCOs, it is vital to establish uniform
46standards of medical necessity and determine the standard for liability.
It is essential that criminal statutes regarding health care providers focus
on delivering a legal framework that ensures consistency and uniformity.
This article will explore the emergence of prosecutions and
administrative actions against MCOs for conduct related to treatment
decisions, and discuss their value, utility and lawfulness.
I. OVERVIEW OF MANAGED CARE AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
AGAINST HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
As we explore the next stage of MCO regulation, it is helpful to begin
by examining the societal mindset that led to the development of managed
care tort law. In general, critics of managed care assert that MCOs are
corrupt, greedy and provide dangerously unsafe health care.4 ' However,
42. See generally Barry R. Furrow, Symposium, Pursuing Health Care In An
Era Of Change: Emerging Legal Issues In Managed Care, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 443
(1997/1998); Regulating The Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and a
New System Ethos, 43 VILL. L. REV. 361 (1998).
43. Pegram v. Hedrick, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
44. See id. 530 U.S. 211; T.R. McLean and E.P. Richards, Managed Care
Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of
ERISA Preemption For State Law Liability For Medical Care Decision Making, 53
FLA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001).
45. See John Humbach, Death Penalty for HMO Treatment Denials?, at
http://www.harp.org/crime.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
46. Schofield, supra note 21, at 625; V.S. Khanna, supra note 38, at 1263.
47. COURT & SMITH, supra note 8, at 6; CANCILLA, supra note 8, at 3;
Janesick, supra note 8 at 72. Websites that provide a forum to educate and
support patients and doctors include: www.consumerwatchdog.org,
www.hmohardball.com and www.hmopage.org. These websites provide
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supporters contend that criticism of managed care is misplaced and
marvel at the ability of MCOs to provide comprehensive health care to
millions despite increasing medical costs.
48
Perhaps this disparity in views stems from consumers' unrealistic
expectations that MCOs should cover all treatment costs, colliding with
the business reality that most MCO's are for-profit companies, rationing
health care costs to remain solvent. 49 This inevitable collision results from
MCOs vaguely defined contract provisions regarding what are necessary
and appropriate medical procedures. In other words, individual MCOs
mechanisms for volunteers to become involved in reforming managed care. Also
see the numerous support groups and web sites that exist to share information
about securing necessary medical treatment from managed care companies. One
site, www.hmopage.org, even has a section titled "Atrocity of the Month," where
aggrieved parties can share their MCO stories.
48. A recent Kaiser Family Foundation/Consumer Reports survey found
eighty-three percent of those questioned who had contact with their managed care
health plan in the last year said their experience was positive. See Press Release,
Kaiser Family Foundation, Most Consumers Generally Positive About Their
Health Care Plan, But Fifty-One Percent Report Having Some Problem in the Past
Year, available at http://www.kff.org/content/2000/20000607a/;
http://www.pwc.org/kaiser.html. See also Richard A. Epstein, HMO Lawsuits: A
Liability for Patients Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 1999, at A26. According to
Epstein, it is important to focus on the numerous success stories of managed care
particularly their ability to provide effective care at low prices, and not be blurred
by the inevitable "injustices." See id.
49. Most MCOs are publicly traded companies with market caps in the
billions that are, like any other stock, frequently volatile and reactive to quarterly
earnings reports. According to Standards and Poors, the health and managed care
industry outlook was stable because of a "greater industry focus on profitability
through premium rate increases and by competition based on factors other than
price.", at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/insurance/bsector/css0613200.htm (last
visited June 13, 2000) (on file with author). In addition, Venus Capital opined that
investors should not be discouraged with current spread sheets of some managed
care companies in light of "the guarantee that people will fall sick and HMO's will
never run out of business." at http://www.venuscapital.com/articles/hmo.htm (Nov.
1998). Eileen O'Connor, Managed Care: A Patient's Perspective, CNN.CoM, at
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/9906/27/patients.perspective (June 27, 1999)
("Complaints spur proposed legislation. Democratic lawmakers say 115 million
Americans report that they or someone they know have experienced problems
with their MCO.").
50. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is
2001]
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can generally dictate what medical treatment they will cover based on
their funding power."
While the funding power of insurance carriers has always existed,
MCOs differ from insurance carriers through their use of URs 2 Unlike
insurance carriers, MCOs typically exercise treatment authority prior to
the administration of treatment. Moreover, MCO's are able to exert more
control over physicians than insurance carriers. Furthermore, URs are
widely recognized as an effective tool in reducing unnecessary care and
saving money.- Typically, an individual other than the treating physician
conducts URs. Unfortunately, due to the high cost of health care, a
treatment denial results in the patient not receiving the physician's
recommended treatment:
Of course, not every UR decision to deny coverage results in patient
Medically Necessary, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 229, 229-230 (1999). Most MCO
contract provisions contain the clause: "with great deference afforded to the
judgment of the MCO." According to Aetna Chairman William Donaldson,
"people want more than what they bought, the coverage that's been bought.
[They want] a $1 million experimental something or other. We say, 'no, that isn't
covered by your policy."' Brubaker, supra note 33, at H12.
51. David Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Payor Liability for Medical
Treatment Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861 (1991).
Because the costs of health care have become so prohibitive that
realistically most patients simply cannot afford to pay for medical care
without insurance coverage and because physicians and other health care
providers cannot afford to provide care without receiving payment, third-
party payors who 'pay the piper' often 'call the tune' by deciding which
medical treatment will be covered.
Id. at 863. Case law, legislation, and ethics also play a role in deciding whether
treatment is necessary or required. See e.g., Wickline v. California, 192 Cal App.
3d 1630 (Cal. 1986).
52. Shuren, supra note 10, at 741; Glodt, supra note 7, at 653-54.
53. Kinney, supra note 8, at 337.
54. See Trueman, supra note 7, at 193. It is important to note that prospective
utilization review is just one of three types of UR; the other two being concurrent
review and retrospective review. See Shuren, supra note 10, at 742-43. See also
Jennifer M. Jendusa, The Denial of Benefits Quandary and Managed Care:
McGraw v. Prudential Insurance Company, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 115
(1999). UR "assures that payment is only made in cases where the services are
medically necessary and appropriate given the patient's needs and the play
policy." Id. at 123.
55. See Jendusa, supra note 54, at 126. See also Shuren, supra note 10, at 772.
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harm. 6 For MCOs to be financially viable, a physician's recommendation
for treatment cannot bind the MCO 7 In addition, MCOs acknowledge
that the structure of their business discourages underutilization, primarily
due to their desire to have satisfied customers.58
Patient frustration has spawned litigation against FFS and MCOs and
ERISA has effectively shut down many of the actions brought against
MCOs. 9 ERISA, which applies to most employee-sponsored health
plans, seeks to protect employees from fraud and mismanagement in their
employee benefit plans and to provide limited remedies.6 An MCO
benefits under ERISA because: "(1) state law is preempted by federal
law; (2) there are no jury trials; (3) there are no compensatory or punitive
damages; (4) relief is usually limited to the amount of the benefit in
question; and (5) claims against administrators may receive a deferential
standard of review.",
61
56. Krohn, supra note 4, at 446. A recent University of California, San
Francisco study found that MCOs provide the same level of care and quality as
fee-for-service payers. Rovner, THE DAILY RECORD, May 18, 2001, available at
http://www.kff.org. The study noted that MCOs "do considerably worse in patient
satisfaction and access to care." Id. Some of the reasons for treatment denial
decisions are: "lack of medical necessity; unapproved or nonformulary drugs;
referral requirements no being met; out of network services; contract
interpretation; benefit exclusions; billing and coding discrepancies; and lack of
coverage for durable medical equipment." Ann H. Nevers, Consumer Managed
Care Appeals: Are the Available Procedural Protections Fundamentally Fair?, 33 J.
HEALTH L. 287, 88 (2000).
57. See generally Sarchett v. Blue Shield of California, 729 P.2d 267 (Cal.
1987); Duncan v. J.C. Penney Life Ins., 388 So. 2d 470 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Franks
v. Louisiana Health, 382 So. 2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
58. Krohn, supra note 4, at 452.
59. Fact Sheet, Why Must HMOs be Liable?, at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/fs/fs000207.php3 (last visited Dec. 18, 2001)
(stating the problem with ERISA is that "[u]nder ERISA, HMOs have no
incentive to provide expensive, medically appropriate treatment, because they are
not held accountable for the consequences of their denials. If ERISA rules
applied to bank robberies, convicted thieves would simply have to give the money
back.").
60. See Pear, supra note 7, at Al (noting the limitations of ERISA in that,
"the law (only) allows patients to recover.., the value of denied benefits, not
punitive damages or compensation for lost wages or pain or suffering.").
61. Jamie Court, Internal Memo Shows Insurer Tries to Reclassify Cases
Under ERISA; Seeking "Gray Areas" where "ERISA... May Influence Our
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Although judges have lamented ERISA for its lack of a meaningful
remedy for otherwise valid claims, plaintiffs' attorneys have not been
deterred. 62  In fact, civil plaintiffs have experienced some degree of
judicial success in civil actions. In addition, civil actions filed against
MCOs have asserted the following legal theories: (1) medical malpractice;
(2) negligence; (3) gross negligence; (4) corporate negligence; (5)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) breach of good faith and
fair dealing; (7) negligent hiring, retention, or supervision; (8) bad faith;
(9) breach of an insurance contract; (10) breach of a fiduciary duty; (11)
interference with the physician-patient relationship; (12)
misrepresentation; and (13) utilizing the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute.63
Much of the managed health care debate has focused on reforming
ERISA to allow injured subscribers greater access to courts, thus
ostensibly increasing MCO accountability. 64 The forthcoming discussion
Course of Action," (July 9, 1999), available at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/pr/pr000163.php3 (last visited Dec.
18, 2001) (quoting Provident attorney Jeff McCall from the case of Schneider v.
Provident).
62. Accord Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, (5th Cir.
1992); Cannon v. Group Health Services of Oklahoma, 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir.
1996); Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ala. 1988);
Andrews-Clark v. Travelers Insurance Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997). See
also Judges Urge ERISA Reform, available at
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/fs/fs000141.php3 (last visited Dec.
18, 2001).
63. See generally Trueman, supra note 7. U.S. v. NHC Healthcare Corp. 115
F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Herrera v. Lovelace Health Systems, Inc., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 1327 (D. N.M. 1999); See also Shannon P. Duffy, Judge Dismisses Civil
RICO Suit Against Aetna, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, available at
http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/A6799-1999Sep30.html (Oct. 1, 1999)
(reporting that U.S. District Court Judge John P. Fullam, in Philadelphia,
dismissed a RICO action against an MCO in Maio v. Aetna, Inc.)(on file with
author).
64. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993)
(affirming a judgment for the MCO). The case, which was filed in state court but
preempted to federal court pursuant to ERISA, involved a patient who died
waiting for his MCO to authorize funding for a heart transplant. The court noted
in dicta that, "in a different case, the cancellation of a beneficiary's surgery by an
ERISA benefits provider may lay the basis for nonprempted state law claims." Id.
at 303.
Tough Love
will not address whether health care should be a right, whether Congress
needs to overhaul ERISA, nor whether the managed care structure is
somehow intrinsically flawed. Rather, the discussion will focus on the
emerging trend of criminal and administrative actions against MCOs.
Implicit in a prosecution or administrative action against an MCO is the
acknowledgment that-while dealing with an industry that has distinct
issues-it is ultimately just another industry held responsible for its
actions and criminally accountable when it causes harm. Given that states
generally assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life,
it is a state's obligation to enact legislation regulating conduct that causes
either a wrongful death or injury.65
However, civil litigation cannot remain the only avenue for redress
against MCOs for several reasons. First, critics have expressed skepticism
that quality medical care will be obtained through the tort system. Other
critics contend that litigation will not have an appreciable impact on
MCOs. For instance, some critics argue that MCOs would most likely
react to unfavorable court decisions by reducing care. Undoubtedly, the
reduction of care will ultimately result in an increase of uninsured
Americans.6'
Moreover, the tort system has proven to be inadequate in preventing
instances of undertreatment or denial of necessary care." For example, as
demonstrated by the increasing cost of prescription drugs, MCOs will
65. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889); McCoy v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 391 A.2d 723, 726 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 715-16 (1997). While Glucksberg dealt
with a constitutional challenge to Washington's ban on physician-assisted suicide,
its discussion of a state interest in the preservation of life is instructive. See also
Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 190 Ariz. 441, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
66. See Frank Diamond, Liability's Jaws Closing on HMOs, (Mar. 1999) at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9903/9903.liability.shtml (last visited
Dec. 18, 2001)(quoting Kevin Outterson, Vice Chairman of the American Bar
Association's Managed Care Committee: "There have been some estimates that
health care premiums could rise 10% or more if HMOs are held liable for
treatment decisions."). See also Humbach, supra note 45; David Priver, HMO
Suits That Help Lawyers Harm Health Care Consumers, Scripps Howard News
Service, Apr. 1, 2000, available at http://www.aetna.com/legal-issues/saying/
hmosuits.htm (stating that "the money HMOs spend to defend against lawsuits,
plus any potential settlement payments must be accounted for, and at least a
portion of this expense will end up tacked on to our health care bills.").
67. Humbach, supra note 45.
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68simply raise premiums to cover the added expense.
Civil penalties are also inadequate to completely deter and punish
MCO misconduct, given that the benefits outweigh the penalties. In other
words, civil remedies, "fail to provide adequate incentives for
compliance."'6 9
Congress could certainly restructure managed care, but in view of their
inaction on this issue over the last several years, meaningful legislative
relief may need to come from the states.70 Several states have either
passed laws or are considering laws to create external statutes.7 ' A state-
created external statute allows an MCO subscriber to appeal a treatment
denial decision to an independent panel of physicians who would render
72binding opinions. But external physician reviews will not address all
improper MCO treatment decisions, nor will they ensure that MCOs are
held accountable for their improper decisions that cause harm.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not considered the issue of whether
state-created external review statutes violate ERISA. Federal appellate
opinions on the lawfulness of these statutes are mixed, thus the continued
viability of external reviews in their current format is uncertain.73 While
ERISA seems to permeate almost every managed care legal issue, it will
not impact criminal statutes. Since ERISA does not apply to criminal
statutes, state-enacted criminal laws will not be preempted.74
To ensure that criminal statutes targeting improper treatment denial
decisions are lawful, it is imperative that legislators formally clarify the
68. Julie Appleby, Health Guides Could Raise Premiums, USA TODAY, May
17, 2001, at Bi. ("'Managed care is no longer trying to control costs,' says Todd
Richter of Banc of America Securities. 'Insurers will simply take whatever they
have to pay for these drugs and pass that cost along directly to employers, who will
raise co-payments and deductibles for their workers."').
69. Humphreys, supra note 29, at 319.
70. Eileen O'Connor, Democrats Holdup Senate Over HMO Reform,
CNN.coM, June 23, 1999, at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/06/
23/congress.healthcare/index.html (discussing the political dynamics involved with
managed care reform); O'Connor, supra note 49 (discussing the impact of
managed care reform).
71. Cramer, supra note 6, at 45.
72. Id.
73. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Ins., 220 F.3d 641, 644-45 (5th
Cir. 2000); see also Moron v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959, 969, 971-
72 (7th Cir. 2000).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)4 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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duty MCOs owe their subscribers by:
(1) Defining uniform standards/guidelines of medically
necessary care (to establish a minimum MCO duty of care); and
(2) Proscribing conduct that displays an intentional (whether
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence) disregard to
medically necessary and appropriate care standards where that
• • 75
decision causes harm,
With criminal statutes structured to guarantee a minimum level of care,
the state need not worry about MCOs contracting to a lower or
dangerously inadequate standard of health care-a current concern.7' As
discussed above, concern for the financial welfare of MCOs is not a valid
legal, social or policy reason to exempt MCOs from punitive exposure for
intentional acts of misconduct that cause injury.77
To be sure, MCO criminal liability could emanate today from either
state or federal law, or as a result of a specific contract provisions. The
court in Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 7 a case involving two men hired to
care for an elderly man, held that "where one person owes to another
either a legal or a contractual duty, an omission to perform that duty
resulting in ... death" could result in a homicide conviction. 79  The
Pestinikas court affirmed a murder conviction for a breach of contractual
duty to provide life-sustaining care - essentially a crime of omission.,
75. See generally United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Centers,
945 F. Supp. 1485, 1487-88 (W.D. Okla. 1996), United States v. NHC Healthcare
Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Humbach, supra note 45. See
also Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339, 1345 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(upholding a criminal conviction for murder in the third degree and for recklessly
endangering another person. In assessing whether a breach of a contract could
result in criminal charges, the court answered in the affirmative, holding that when
a defendant fails to perform a contract to provide care for another and that failure
causes the death of the other person, culpability may follow); Morreim, supra note
4, at 942.
76. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 1995). ("It may
well be that an employer and an HMO could agree that a quality of health care
standard articulated in their contract would replace the standards that would
otherwise be supplied by the applicable state law of tort.") (emphasis added).
77. Humbach, supra note 45.
78. 617 A.2d 1339, 1344 (Pa. Super. 1992).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1345, 1350. Judge Tamilia, in a concurring opinion, noted the
absurdity of holding otherwise: "[W]e can be punished for throwing trash on a
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Note that while the term "medical necessity" is frequently used, there is
no consensus on its definition. Some define "medically necessary care" as:
"care for which (1) the benefits outweigh the risks ... (2) the benefits to
the patient are likely and substantial, and (3) physicians have determined
that not recommending the care would be improper."" Others advocate
linking medical necessity to professional practice standards - with great
deference to the recommendations of the treating physician.12 In any
definition, MCOs would most likely seek a distinction between medically
beneficial and medically necessary care, along with a continued ability to
contain costs.
83
However medical necessity is defined, a consistent approach is essential
to avoid the sort of patchwork managed care regulations that have
developed through litigation and state legislation. State-enacted statutes
that define both medical necessity and the required elements for a
criminal conviction may be just the approach that is needed.
The proposition that corporations may be liable for the acts of its
agents, under certain circumstances, would certainly apply in the managed
care arena•4  Similarly, as seen with environmental law violations,
corporate officers in a position to have prevented an incident can be held
85criminally liable, even if they did not participate in the improper action.
Hence, criminal statutes may be the inevitable remedy for a system where
lives hang in the balance of what is ultimately a business decision.
However, it is important to remain focused on treatment decisions
contrary to articulated professional practice standards that cause harm to
86patients and not to adverse medical results or malpractice cases.
sidewalk yet may suffer no penalty for discarding a human life by denying him
sustenance and deliberately causing his death." Id. at 1354.
81. Steven M. Asch et al., Measuring Under Use of Necessary Care Among
Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries Using Inpatient and Outpatient Claims, 284 JAMA
2325-26 (2000).
82. Rosenbaum, supra note 50, at 229.
83. See generally McGraw v. Prudential, 137 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
84. In United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152
(W.D. Mo. 2000), (noting, "it is not the place of this Court to exempt an entire
industry from FCA liability because it may be hurt by such suits.").
85. See generally Boise Dodge v. United States, 406 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
86. Kelley, supra note 8, at BI. ("What I say to my friends when these cases
come up is, 'what happened to the good old-fashioned concept of malpractice?'
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The managed care concept was initiated in the 1920s by a group of
California doctors who persuaded an insurance company to pay them a
fixed amount of money to provide health coverage to thousands of
designated employees. 87 The doctors believed they could lower expenses
for insurers by focusing on preventive health and safety, rather than just
treating specific injuries or illnesses.88
Despite this early initiative, until recently, the dominant form of health
coverage in the United States continued to be fee-for-service.89 Fee-for-
service (FFS) basically allows a physician to decide what treatment, if any,
is provided to the patient.9° The physician is then compensated according
to the number of services he provides.9 "In the past half-century an
extraordinarily generous, uncritical reimbursement system has
empowered physicians to define and deliver quality... "92 Thus, this
method of payment allows physicians to tailor the care they give to their
patients with little regard for cost.
Under FFS, the insurance companies were left to pay for this generous
and liberal method of medical coverage.9' Doctors, of course, prefer such
a system since the physician determines whether treatment is provided
and specifies what type of treatment is given.94 With skyrocketing medical
costs and millions of people uninsured, change in the medical care
delivery system was inevitable.95 The change was managed care, and
insurers hoped this new plan of delivering health care, while keeping
prices down, would transform the health care industry for the better.
96
Managed care advocates claimed their method of reimbursement would
save costs by following five basic principles: "(1) a focus on wellness and
prevention; (2) a drive for 'appropriate' treatments, meaning the most
Doctors had been doing bad things long before managed care was known as a
concept.").
87. Dr. Robert C. L. Law, Managed Care and HMO - the Basics, at
http://www.hkam.org.hk/temp/hmo.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
8& Id.
89. Id.; FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 492-96.
90. Law, supra note 87.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; Jendusa, supra note 54, at 121.
94. Glodt, supra note 7, at 645.
95. Id.
96. Id.; FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 492.
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cost-effective care; (3) integration of services; (4) transfer of financial risk
from the insurer to provider to the greatest extent possible; and (5)
security of access to health care for the consumer-employee at a fixed
price. 97  These methods of curtailing insurer costs proved to be so
successful that the insurers began to see profits.
Managed care systems have been able to earn profits primarily because
of: (1) down-streaming or "cost containment financial arrangements with
providers" and (2) prospective review of physician recommended
treatment to reduce unnecessary care to patients.98 The primary vehicle
for implementing managed care has been the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO).
"HMOs take away doctors' and hospitals' financial incentive to over-
treat patients with costly tests and surgeries, since they don't get paid
more for ordering more tests. HMOs provide not only cheaper medical
care, but also better treatment... because they encourage checkups and
immunizations to keep patients healthy." 9 HMO oversight of physician
care has been instrumental in making this delivery system successful.
However, evaluating the relative success of this delivery system depends
on one's perspective.
Managed care is essentially a system where an attending doctor's
recommendations do not always control the course of treatment.1°° Many
physicians react with tremendous disappointment and concern when their
recommendations are not followed. Furthermore, patients often become
incensed and confused when their doctor's course of treatment is denied
by the MCO. 1
97. Goldt, supra note 7, at 645.
98. Kelley, supra note 8, at B3; Trueman, supra note 7, at 192.
99. Kelley, supra note 8, at B3.
100. Patricia Mullen Ochmann, Managed Care Organizations Manage to
Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs. Quality Lead to ERISA's Inequitable
Preemption Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571, 572 (2001).
101. In a letter to the editor of AMA NEWS, Dr. Ronald Bronow said, "we
physicians should stop selling our souls to the HMO devils and begin protecting
out patients' rights." AMA NEWS, June 15, 1998, at http://www.hmopage.org/
selling.html. See also Paul Zielbauer, Doctors Sue Health Plans Over Coverage,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at B1 ("Two groups representing 7,000 Connecticut
doctors filed a battery of lawsuits today against six large health maintenance
organizations, claiming that the companies 'systematically harmed' patients by
arbitrarily denying crucial medical treatment and illegally withholding millions of
dollars in payments they owe doctors.").
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"The managed care delivery system has created a situation where
• • 102
nobody is happy," said one hospital administrator. "Doctors are angry
because they used to be the seat of all power, and now they are stuck
rationing care. Hospitals do not like it because they've had to cut their
costs and push patients out the door. And patients say they're getting
worse care."'1 3 Thus, despite the initial optimism that managed care
would ameliorate the problems of high medical costs, the delivery system
is fraught with many serious problems.
Congress acknowledged the importance of basic treatment principles
for certain medical conditions and healthcare concerns by enacting
corrective legislation.'04  For the most part, the legislation has been
criminal in nature and has not been tailored specifically to target managed
102. Kelley, supra note 8, at B3.
103. Id. Another concern is that the managed care system inherently presents
a conflict of interest for the MCOs, because if they (MCOs) provide fewer
services, they will make a larger profit, or save more money. This directly, and
deliberately, creates the opposite incentive to the incentives in a fee-for-service
system where a providers income increases if more services are furnished. See
Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, Defining "Medically Necessary" Services to
Protect Plan Members, (Mar. 1997), available at
http://www.webcom.com/bazelon/mhcare.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2001). Doctor
frustration may be reaching its apex with a pending RICO allegation against
several MCOs in Federal District Court in Miami. The plaintiffs include the state
medical associations of California, Georgia, and Texas and individual doctors from
seven states. In part, the complaint alleges that MCOs, "had used cost-based
criteria to approve or deny claims for payment and had offered cash incentives to
claim reviewers who would deny or limit tests and treatments that doctors felt
were necessary." See Milt Freudenheim, 3 State Groups Join Doctors in Insurer
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2001, at C13.
104. Along with state mandates for coverage of certain conditions, the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(a), (d)(2)(a) (1994) applies to hospital emergency rooms that have
treatment agreements under the Medicare program. Summers v. Baptist Med.
Ctr., 91 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The operative language of the statute...
is that... a hospital 'must provide for an appropriate medical screening
examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department ... to
determine whether or not an emergency medical condition exists'."). See also the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994),
(prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, age, and
gender). But see Rovner, supra note 56 (concluding that MCOs provide the same
level of care and quality as FFS). See also FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 474-76
(discussing the 1,260 state imposed mandates on health plans).
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care systems that deny necessary medical care. Thus, injured parties
seeking redress for injuries caused by inadequate MCO decisions must
seek either criminal prosecution of the provider or rely on creative
applications of criminal statutes in a civil setting.
Injured parties have used traditional common law or existing statutes to
bring criminal and civil suits against MCOs. Parties have also used The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 5 and The
False Claims Act (FCA),"' which are traditional criminal statutes, to bring
both criminal and civil claims.
Throughout the 1990s, prosecutors relied on existing statutes or
common law to preserve states' interests against fraud at the hands of
health care delivery providers. By criminally charging health care
providers for inadequate patient treatment in Medicaid and Medicare
situations, prosecutors protected the quality and dignity of life for health
107plan participants. Analysis of these early prosecutions provides an
interesting basis for later actions holding managed care providers civilly
liable.
One of the first prosecutions brought using common law charges of
manslaughter against a health care provider was initiated after two
women, Margaret White and Elizabeth Ellis, died in a nursing home'
The state filed criminal charges against the corporate owner of the home
for involuntary manslaughter, among other charges, alleging that the
victims died as a result of "criminally negligent and grossly incompetent
care."'09 The government also alleged that the victims were not provided
with the "quality of care which promotes the maintenance and
enhancement of the quality of life."" 0 Although the defendant agreed to a
plea bargain in which it was fined $20,000 and ordered to pay $100,000 in
court costs, this case became a harbinger of the increasing scrutiny MCOs
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
107. A.J. Hostetler, Four Charged in Purported Fatal Neglect, THE PATRIOT-
NEWS (Harrisburg, PA), Sept. 2, 1992, at B3. See also Jennifer C. Jaff, Goliath as
Victim: Can the State Bring a Civil Action Under RICO?, 3 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH
L.J. 5 (1999/2000).
108. Lee Linder, Firm Pleads Guilty to Manslaughter Charge, THE SUNDAY




would face over the next decade."'
Another possible route to criminally prosecute MCOs is RICO."'
Even though this statute was initially enacted to battle organized crime,113
it has recently been applied in civil suits by individuals and states against
health care providers who engage in patterns of illegal activity.1
While some cases were disposed of through either dismissal or
settlement, civil actions portend a growing trend of holding MCOs
accountable for their mistakes and bad acts."5 "RICO allows states to
send providers a strong message that fraud will not be tolerated - and that
it can have consequences beyond simply being compelled to pay
restitution - thereby furthering the strong public policy against health
care fraud."' 16
117A recent civil RICO claim, Humana v. Forsyth, affirmed a civil RICO
action against a managed care provider. Accordingly, it is probable that
more civil RICO actions will be brought by plaintiffs against managed
care providers."9 The viability of civil RICO actions against MCOs,
however, is still unclear. For plaintiffs to prevail in future civil actions,
they will most likely have to show specific instances of fraud and collusion
by the MCO as opposed to a broader showing of improper financial terms
or unconscionable contract provisions.
Although criminal charges can be brought against an MCO by a
prosecutor under existing statutes or RICO, actions under the False
Claims Act (FCA) have received the most judicial attention. Federal
prosecutors have used the FCA to pursue cases alleging misconduct by
111. See generally Frost and Beck, supra note 22.
112. Supra note 105.
113. Id. at Congressional Statement of Findings and Purposes.
114. Jaff, supra note 105, at 5-9 (discussing Connecticut's two civil actions
under RICO against a health care provider). See also Laura B. Benko, Managed
Care Under Siege, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 10, 2000, at 34.
115. Jaff, supra note 105, at 22.
116. Id. at 23.
117. Humana v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999).
118. Id. at 313.
119. See generally, Maio v. Aetna Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-1969, 1999 WL 800315,
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999) (dismissing a civil suit brought under RICO, for lack of
strong factual basis).
120. Supra note 106. See also Schofield, supra note 21, at 122.
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healthcare providers. 2 ' According to Assistant U.S. Attorney James
Sheehan, prosecuting health care providers under the FCA is "easier than
you think... [d]octors, hospitals, and plans, all keep data that can point to
plans that make it impossible to get appropriate care."'22 Consequently,
the FCA has become an important weapon in a prosecutor's arsenal to
protect patients from illegal acts by providers such as under-utilization.
The core elements of an under-utilization action under the FCA are:
(1) the defendant promised the government (or a program
beneficiary) that it would provide health care services (or
benefits as the case may be); (2) medically necessary treatment
was not provided; and (3) the treatment was not furnished as
part of either a deliberate plan to make more money and
defraud the health benefit program or pervasive reckless
conduct . 23
Moreover under the FCA knowledge is defined as:
'[A]ctual knowledge,' 'deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity of the information,' or 'reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the information,' people involved in all aspects of
submitting health care claims to the Government can be liable
even if they do not actually know of or intend to submit false
claims.
12 4
While the FCA is a powerful criminal and civil statute, it has certain
limitations in combating underutilization. It is argued that the FCA
addresses "only false claims and does not reach fraudulent and abusive
conduct .... [D]amages under the FCA [only] relate to the Government's
injury .... [while u]nderutilization injures consumers and not the
Government... [and] the FCA covers fraud only in federal programs."' 25
Despite its shortcomings, application of the FCA has been instrumental in
combating health care fraud and, in particular, deterring instances of
underutilization by MCOs.
12 6
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994); Diamond, supra note 66. See also Robert
Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to
Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105,
106 (1999).
122. Meyer, supra note 10, at 28-9.
123. Frost and Beck, supra note 22, at 4.
124. Krohn, supra note 4, at 456.
125. Id. at 467.
126. Id.
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Even though the FCA has been successfully used by prosecutors to
impose liability on providers, courts still find it difficult to define a
medical standard of care. This difficulty is also encountered by legislators
in drafting criminal statutes to combat improper decisions that deny
treatment to plan participants. One case addressing a FCA prosecution in
the Medicare/Medicaid context noted that:
It may be easier for a maker of widgets to determine whether its
product meets contract specifications than for a hospital to
determine whether its service meets 'professionally recognized
standards for health care.' In the Court's view, however, a
problem of measurement should not pose a bar to pursuing an
FCA claim against a provider of substandard health care• . • . 127
services under appropriate circumstances.
Subsequent cases have held that the government's case could proceed
despite the lack of clarity in this area. One case stated, "[u]ntil this issue
works its way through the appellate system it will remain unclear whether
the Government's movement towards increased scrutiny of care facilities
through FCA lawsuits is a bona fide exercise of prosecutorial resources or
an improper expansion of this powerful Act.'
28
In addition to the common law or existing statutes, RICO and FCA,
prosecutors can also charge providers with criminal violations such as
129
theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, false
statements relating to health care matters,' 3 fraud and swindles,"' fraud132 133
by wire, radio and television,"' health care fraud, obstruction of criminal
investigations of health care offenses,' 34 engaging in monetary transactions
in property derived from specified unlawful activity3 ' and obstruction of
justice."3
127. United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctr., 945 F. Supp. 1485,
1488 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
128. United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152
(W.D. Mo. 2000).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
130. Id. § 1035.
131. Id. § 1341.
132. Id. § 1343.
133. Id. § 1347.
134. Id. § 1518.
135. Id. § 1518.
136. Id. § 1518(a). See Paul E. Cooney, Outline for the Law of Health Care
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Fraud cases in managed care brought under the above options, even in
a Medicaid and Medicare context, provide powerful guidance to those
who determine the viability and appropriateness of state action against
MCOs. New forms of fraud that involve diversion of capitation fees and
result in inadequate medical care can threaten human health to a greater
extent than the types of fraud seen in traditional fee-for-service plans.137
Prosecutions for fraud in underutilization situations, such as those
involving subscriber death or injury are instructive for legislators drafting
managed care/health plan criminal statutes. Evidence establishing
managed care fraud as a result of underutilization include:
[H]igh incidence of complaints by patients, physicians, and
payers; barriers to care (inconvenient provider locations and
delays in rendering care, authorizing benefits or making
specialty referrals);... low utilization statistics compared with
national norms or with fee-for-service patients;.., high
percentage of successful appeals of benefit denials;.. .and
inadequate staffing or training.
The proliferation of fraud cases against MCOs illustrates the
willingness of prosecutors and courts to hold health care providers
criminally accountable for their misconduct. Since state legislatures are
drafting statutes that specifically target improper treatment decisions and
the denial of medically necessary care, it is necessary to clarify important
legal and policy problems surrounding this issue."' The remainder of this
article will propose criteria for politicians to consider when drafting
ameliorative legislation.
Without an objective standard for what constitutes medically
necessary or appropriate care, legislation to ensure that patients
receive the care for which they have paid will not be effective. -
The Real Issue in the Quality Debate, white paper from the
office of Senator John Chaffee (RI).' 4°
Providers (Spring 2001) (unpublished course outline on file with author).
137. MALCOM K. SPARROW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, FRAUD CONTROL IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY:
ASSESSING THE STATE OF THE ART Dec. 1998, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffilesl/172841.pdf.
138. Frost and Beck, supra note 22, at 5.
139. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-44-7, (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1997); Murphy v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 949 P.2d 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
140. Stauffer, supra note 6.
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II. A PROPOSAL TO STANDARDIZE THE DEFINITION OF "MEDICAL
NECESSITY"
Defining the phrase "medically necessary" is critical because most
decisions are based on an MCOs definition and interpretation of this
phrase.' Even though the phrase is routinely used in treatment decisions,
there is neither an industry definition nor a uniform statutory definition.
Several states have responded to concerns that MCOs, taking an overly
restrictive statutory interpretation of "medically necessary," could deny
142
some subscribers legitimately appropriate health care. Consequently,
the search for a universal definition of "medically necessary" care has• - 141
become a point of debate among legal scholars, courts and legislatures.
If a criminal statute is enacted to address improper treatment denial
decisions based on medical necessity, the state-defined standards of care
will be the foundation of MCO prosecutions. While any prosecution
would, in part, be based on the failure of an MCO to follow a reasonable
process when treating patients, it is imperative to review court opinions
addressing medical necessity, along with proposed definitions to obtain a
firm understanding of the issue.
The phrase "medical necessity" first captured public attention in 1996
when it was discussed by Dr. Linda Peeno in her testimony before the
U.S. Congress.1" Dr. Peeno stated that as a claims reviewer for an MCO
she caused the death of a man by denying him a necessary operation.
141. Griner, supra note 51, at 898.
142. Id. See Campion Quinn, Issues of Medical Necessity: A Medical
Director's Guide to Good Faith Adjudication, 3 MANAGED CARE ADMIN. 883
(1997)("Current corporate definitions of medical necessity are crafted in weak,
ambiguous, or circular language."). See also Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law,
supra note 103; Margaret Gilhooley, Broken Back: A Patient's Reflections on the
Process of Medical Necessity Determinations, 40 VILL. L. REV. 153 (1995) ("The
determination of medical necessity appeals to the norm of professional judgment,
but the criteria employed are not necessarily based on a professional consensus
and may not even be based on public information.") Id. at 162.
143. See generally Linda Bergthold, Medical Necessity: Do We Need It?, 14
HEALTH AFFAIRS 180 (1995).
144. Dr. Linda Peeno, Transcript: Managed Care Ethics: The Close View,
Prepared For U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Commerce Subcomm. on
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She now advocates reforming health care by removing some of the broad
discretion found in MCO health care plans to determine whether
.. • . 146
treatment will be provided to plan participants. Dr. Peeno referred to
medical necessity decisions as the MCOs "smart bomb" for "cost
containment" because these decisions are frequently based on "criteria
that is non-standard and rarely developed along accepted clinical
methods.' 47 MCO advocates, on the other hand, dispute the need for
state mandated medical necessity definitions. One senior MCO executive
explained:
We're trying to bring some discipline to, let's say doctors...
who send out for 25 tests or who do things that are unnecessary.
The medical profession has been taught in school that
everything is okay. I mean: 'Send out for 1,000 tests. Do it.'
You know, with no attention to price control. No attention to
the efficient and effective practice of medicine.' '148 Former
Speaker of the House, U.S. Representative Newt Gingrich, felt a
mandated definition would, "bankrupt every insurance
company."'
149
Only the passage of time will tell whether these MCO concerns are
well-founded or hyperbole. A universal definition of care, if
appropriately drafted, would serve only to clarify formally what MCO
plans have promised to provide. While a state mandated definition would
effectively establish a minimum duty of care, most MCOs have already
promised to provide comprehensive and medically necessary health care.
Accordingly, the state is merely seeking to define this phrase for the
benefit of citizens and health care providers. When articulating a
standard of care, the state is making an effort to direct MCOs to follow a
reasonable process when making coverage decisions.
The need for a universal definition of medical necessity is even more
apparent after reviewing appellate decisions dealing with the issue.r °
Court cases dealing with False Claims Act (FCA) actions and treatment
146. Id.
147. Id.; Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1996).
148. Brubaker, supra note 33, at H12 (quoting Aetna Chairman William
Donaldson).
149. STAUFFER, supra note 6 (quoting former House Speaker Newt Gingrich
(R-GA), as originally printed in CQ DAILY MONITOR, Aug. 10, 1998).
150. See cases cited supra note 6.
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decisions in civil cases are particularly instructive."] In cases where no
defined standard of care is present, or a dispute exists about the specific
medical procedure utilized, courts appear unwilling to impose criminal
responsibility on the MCO.1
2
The court in Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.'53 affirmed summary
judgment in favor of a health care company that tested plasma for HIV
and hepatitis, but failed to perform an additional plasma test that arguably
could have been beneficial. The Luckey court noted, "[w]hat tests to
perform, and when are difficult questions... no one believes (at least, no
one should believe) that every possible test, no matter how expensive,
should be administered to avoid every conceivable risk, no matter how
small. Some form of cost-benefit inquiry must be carried out."'
The FCA suit in Luckey ultimately failed because the court concluded
that "[aill this record reveals is a dispute about whether [the laboratory's]
testing protocols could be improved. An affirmative answer to that
question would not suggest that [the laboratory's] representations to the
United States.. .were false or fraudulent."'55 Similarly, the court in United
States ex rel. Swafford v. Borgess Medical Center also granted a
defendant's motion for summary judgment in a False Claims Act action.' 6
The complaint in Borgess alleged that the claims submitted by the medical
center to the government were implicitly false because of "inadequate and
pathetic patient care."'57  However, there were no specifically
promulgated regulations regarding the procedures for a doctor's review of
venous ultrasound studies.'
In United States v. Billig, the Naval-Marine Corps court reversed a
physician's manslaughter conviction!" Dr. Billig was charged with
causing the death of patients under his care, in part because he failed to
151. Id.
152. See e.g. United States ex rel. Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d
730 (7th Cir. 1999), United States ex rel. Swafford v. Borgess Medical Center, 98 F.
Supp. 2d 822 (W.D. Mich. 2000), United States v. Billig, 26 M.J. 744 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 1988).
153. Luckey, 183 F.3d at 732.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 733.
156. Ex rel. Swafford, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
157. Id. at 829.
158. Id. at 827-28.
159. United States v. Billig, 26 M.J. 744, (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1988).
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use a preferred heart surgery procedure. 60 In reversing the conviction,
the court stated, "we decline to substitute our judgment for that of a
surgeon choosing a medically acceptable surgical technique.""16  In a
footnote, the court observed:
[o]ur refusal to second guess reasonable medical decisions made
by physicians in the course of surgery is closely analogous to our
refusal to question judgment calls made by attorneys during the
course of providing legal representation. We will not evaluate
strategic professional choices from hindsight, but from the
perspective of the professional at the time such choices are
made, with the presumption that the conduct is reasonable.1
61
Luckey, Swafford and Billig illustrate the reluctance of courts to impose
legal culpability in situations of medical uncertainty or good faith
mistakes. These cases emphasize the importance of elevating the
definition of "medically necessary" and "appropriate care" to a level at
which reasonable minds cannot differ when writing criminal statues for
improper managed care treatment denial decisions.'63
Court cases dealing with medical necessity definitions can be divided
into two categories: tort actions and state actions against health care
providers for Medicare and Medicaid patients. While the two lines of
cases clearly have a different basis for liability, both highlight the difficulty
in defining medically necessary and appropriate care and the legal
difficulty in reconciling managed care's emphasis on cost-containment.
The court in McGraw v. Prudential Insurance Company of Americaj 64
which involved a tort action, held that, "[a] decision to deny benefits is
arbitrary and capricious if it is not a reasonable interpretation of the
plan's terms." '65 The court in McGraw dealt with an MCO that "modified
160. Id. at 751-52.
161. Id. at 752.
162. Id. at 752 n.10.
163. A federal appellate judge in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group
noted the difficulty of reviewing the propriety of an MCO decision based on the
phrase, "medically necessary and appropriate care." 917 F.2d 266, 272 (1990).
Judge Boggs wrote, "appropriate is one of the most wonderful weasel words in the
dictionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in the drafting of
legislation. Who, after all, can be found to stand up for 'inappropriate' treatment
or actions of any sort." Id. at 271.
164. 137 F.3d 1253 (10" Cir. 1998).
165. Id. at 1259.
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its definition of medically necessary [to include a requirement
that].. .treatment provide a measurable and substantial increase in
functional ability for a condition having potential for significant
improvement. '"'6  The MCO defended its contract modification as
appropriate because the contract distinguished between medically
167beneficial and medically necessary. In a footnote, the court noted, "[if]
this criterion [were] carried to its logical conclusion, no [Multiple
Sclerosis] patient could qualify for reimbursement of certain medical
services, and the contract of insurance would be illusory."'68 Coverage
was also denied because the plaintiff briefly left the hospital, and thus her
hospital stay could not be "medically necessary." The court found this
denial "shocking," stating "one would assume the opportunity for
entertainment [such as an inpatient leaving the confines of the hospital
with a family member] would be not only therapeutic, but also desirable in
treating this illness (Multiple Sclerosis)."' 69
In Franks v. Louisiana Health Services. & Indemnity. Co., 1' the court
ruled in favor of an MCO when a denial of care was fair and reasonable.
The plaintiff in the case unsuccessfully protested the inherent conflict of
allowing an MCO to make medical necessity decisions. In brief, the
plaintiff stated, "[diefendant is in effect saying that we will sell you this
policy of insurance, however, we will not pay unless we want to pay. This
is the end result of such a ridiculous and incomprehensible scheme as
defendant has placed in its policy.' ' 1 In dicta, the court made a prophetic
observation: "In the absence of a conflict with a statute or with public
policy, an insurer has the same right as an individual to limit its liability
and to impose upon their policy obligations whatever conditions they
please."'1
2
166. Id. at 1260.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1261. See also id. at 1264 n.22 (noting that another MCO treatment
denial decision was based on the MCO's conclusion that it was not medically
necessary for a home nurse to assist the plaintiff in inserting a catheter. In part, the
MCO found medical necessity to be lacking because a "family member or
neighbor" could insert the catheter and that it was so simple that a "monkey could
do that").
170. 382 So.2d 1064 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
171. Id. at 1068.
172. Id. at 1067 (emphasis added).
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At least twenty-three states have attempted to clarify the phrase
"appropriate and medically necessary care.' 73 However, state definitions
vary widely, and as a result no clearly articulated standard has emerged.'7 4
In the event legislators take up the task of drafting criminal statutes,
specific definitions must be crafted. Defining "medical necessity" places
MCOs in a difficult position. MCOs deny physician-recommended
treatment based on vague definitions of medical necessity but fail to
disclose the basis for these standards to the attending physician. "Health
insurers need neither a vague description of medical necessity nor a
specific list of what should be covered and what should not; insurers need
a generally accepted method to determine whether and when a medical
technology is to be considered medically necessary."'
175
Drafting a definition of "medically necessary" and "appropriate care" is
difficult because of the inherent subjectivity of medicine and the frequent
• 76
lack of a clear solution for many health situations. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court held in Boyce Motor Lines v. United States,17  a "criminal
statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct
to one who would avoid its penalties.' 7 8  One official noted that,
"[d]efinitions of 'medical necessity' have to be flexible enough to take into
account the needs of each patient. One-size-fits-all outcomes make
irrelevant the doctor's knowledge of the individual patient; and that is bad
• • • ,,179
medicine, period.
The following proposal for a definition of "medical necessity" could be
applied in a criminal action, because it balances the needs of both the
patient and the MCO:
An insurer should be able to set aside the recommendations of a
treating physician only in restricted circumstances. Decisions
about coverage should continue to be weighed against clinically
173. Stauffer, supra note 6.
174. Id.
175. Jason Mann, Selected Topics in Risk Managed in the Faculty of
Management at the University of Calgary, at http://www.ucalgary.ca/MG/inrm/
finplan/health/med necessity/credits.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
176. Morreim, supra note 4, § V(A).
177. 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
178. Id. at 340.
179. Congressman Greg Ganske, Important Issue Facing House-Senate
Conference on Health Care Reform (House of Representatives, Dec. 18, 2001), at
http://www.fenichel.com/Ganske.shtml.
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accepted standards of medical practice. An insurer's decision
should be lawful only if the insurer can prove that the decision
rests on valid and reliable evidence that is relevant to the
patient's individual circumstances... This... requires insurers
to act reasonably and weigh the reasonableness of their conduct
against professional standards of practice as reflected by valid
and reliable evidence.'
Adequately defining "medically necessary" and "appropriate care" to
support a criminal statute, however, is inherently difficult. If the
definition is too vague, a conviction cannot be sustained. However, a
definition must not be too specific because it must account for the nuances
of each medical condition and distinct patient histories. A simple
standard that places a clearly defined obligation on managed care
providers, along with criteria to follow in the event that the MCO
disagrees with the attending physician's recommendations, will allow
criminal prosecutions to proceed. In Boyce, the Supreme Court
acknowledged,
most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in
factual situations .... Consequently, no more than a reasonable
degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to require
that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line. 1'
Accordingly, while issues of proof and pleadings will be significant hurdles
in health care prosecutions, enactment of criminal statutes for improper
treatment denial decisions, and the accompanying establishment of a duty
of care, is an entirely appropriate area for state intervention. As the court
noted in Wickline v. California,'82 "an erroneous decision in a prospective
review process.., in practical consequences, results in the withholding of
necessary care, potentially leading to a patient's permanent disability or
death."'83
Nothing focuses a subject's attention upon a legal issue as
effectively as the prospect of becoming involved in the criminal
justice system - and the chance that the result will be a prison
180. Rosenbaum, supra note 50, at 229.
181. Boyce Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 340.
182. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630 (1986).
183. Id. at 1634.
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sentence and immense fines. 1
84
III. CRIMINAL PENALTIES
Criminal statutes proscribing improper treatment denial decisions must
contain language that describes the duty owed, the standards by which the
conduct is to be judged and the conduct that is prohibited. Moreover,
such statutes should also embrace the basic tenets of criminal law:
preventing harm, ensuring responsibility and deterring future
misconduct."" It is also important that any statute reflect the criminal law
principle that "the injury to be vindicated is not the personal wrong
suffered by the victim but rather an outrage to the State.
' ' 87
But are criminal statutes appropriate in the managed care arena?
Criminal statutes targeting improper treatment denial decisions by health
care insurers and providers will likely have to respond to several
important challenges. First, unconstitutional vagueness poses a problem
when "[criminal statutes do] not provide fair notice of the conduct
proscribed.""' Second, a criminal statute may be indefinite because it
"confers unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether an
offense was committed."'89 Third, a criminal statute may be improper
because mens rea may not be easily established.9 Managed care
184. Daniel Riesel & James R. Norman, Criminal Enforcement and the
Regulation of the Environment, ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials,
Environmental Litigation (June 1996). See also Greg Garland, Holiday Spirits:
Return to Sender, BALT. SUN, Dec. 24, 1999, at Al (discussing the enactment of a
new criminal act in Maryland making it a felony to ship or distribute wine in the
state without a license). One district attorney said, "I think just the threat of
felony prosecution has curtailed the activity considerably." Id. at A6.
185. See Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1995);
Billingslea v. Texas, 780 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
186. See Brickey, supra note 39, at 504-06.
187. United States v. Billig, 26 M.J. 744, 760 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1988).
188. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952); United
States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 566 (1971). In his dissent in
International Minerals, Stewart, J. said, "[w]hether postulated as a problem of
'mens rea,' of 'willfulness,' of 'criminal responsibility,' or of 'scienter,' the
infliction of criminal punishment upon the unaware has long troubled the fair




providers may also contend that criminal statutes will lead to an increase
in the number of uninsured because few providers will want to incur the
high costs of complying with additional regulations.'
For guidance on these issues, legislators and courts can look to
prosecutions of health care providers based on omissions, fraud,
environmental violations, corporate liability and model penal code
violations. For example, Peterson v. Florida,9 Billingslea v. Texas 93 and
Arizona v. Brown'94 are three cases dealing with elder abuse that
underscore the legislative and prosecutorial support for criminal sanctions
in cases where failing to provide appropriate care results in harm.
In Peterson, where a mother's death was caused by the abysmal care
provided by her children, a Florida court affirmed a manslaughter
conviction based on the defendant's legal duty as a "caregiver."' 9' The
court cited the language of Florida statute § 782.07(2), prohibiting conduct
that causes the death of an elderly or disabled person by culpable
negligence.'9 The statute reads:
[N]eglect of an elderly or disabled person is defined by section
825.102(3) as... [a] caregiver's failure or omission to provide
an elderly person or disabled adult with the care, supervision,
and services necessary to maintain the.., adult's physical and
mental health, including .. medicine, and medical services that a
prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of
the elderly person or disabled adult. 197
Most importantly, the Peterson court broadly interpreted the definition
of a "caregiver" to include "more than just the person or persons who do
the actual physical work... It also reaches those who in fact are
191. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 503 (stating, inter alia, that HMO
regulatory agencies are currently concerned with the "financial solvency of
HMOs"). See also Majority Believe Fewer Providers Will Take on Risk, at
http://www.themcic.com/industry/sow-pr2.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001)(noting
that 60% of health care executives polled in a survey stated that "fewer providers
would take on risk this year... providers have become disenchanted with
managing risk as the losses continue to mount").
192. 765 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
193. 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
194. 631 P.2d 129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
195. Peterson, 765 So. 2d at 865.
196. Id. at 862.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
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'entrusted' with the responsibility for seeing that an elderly or disabled
person is being cared for in a proper and humane manner."198
A defendant found guilty of injuring an elderly person by omission had
his conviction reversed by a Texas Court of Appeals in Billingslea because
no statutory duty of care existed.99 Billingslea involved a relative who,
while living with the decedent, failed to provide the decedent with any
meaningful care despite significant and very obvious health issues.2°°
The Billingslea conviction was reversed because, "the State failed to
establish an essential element of the offense, namely, the duty to act,
because no such duty existed ... Logic dictates that in order for there to
be an omission, there must be a corresponding duty to act.,
201
The Texas legislature created a duty to act with the amendment of
V.T.C.A. Penal Code § 22.04(a). The new statute, which now includes the
elderly, reads:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly by omission, causes a child, elderly
individual, or disabled individual: (1) serious bodily injury; (2)
serious mental deficiency, impairment or injury; or (3) bodily
202injury.
In Brown, an Arizona court affirmed a manslaughter conviction againstS 203
a defendant who ran a boarding home. In that case, a 98 year-old died
of starvation because of the "pitiful care that was given."2 4 The court
noted that,
[T]he law recognizes that under some circumstances the
omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where
such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is
owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter.. .This
rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty
neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral
obligation.2°s
198. Id. at 864.
199. Billingslea v. Texas, 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
200. Id. at 272.
201. Id. at 274, 276.
202. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2001).
203. See Arizona v. Brown, 631 P.2d at 129, 132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
204. Id. at 130.
205. See id. at 131 (quoting People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Mich.
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With respect to criminal statutes targeting improper treatment denial
decisions, the Brown court noted situations where criminal liability may
be imposed for failing to act,
[F]irst, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another;
second, where one stands in a certain status relationship to
another; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty to care
for another; and fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the
care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to
prevent others from rendering aid."2 6
Peterson, Billingslea and Brown provide powerful guidance on the
viability of criminal statutes focusing on treatment denial decisions or
omissions to act. Because MCOs are entrusted with the responsibility of
providing comprehensive medical services, it is entirely appropriate for
MCOs to bear criminal responsibility if they knowingly, recklessly or
negligently engage in conduct that injures a subscriber in violation of
either contract or statute.
Environmental prosecutions, like the elder care cases, are
tremendously helpful in determining the propriety of prospective criminal
statutes against improper treatment denial decisions because of similar
legal, social and policy influences. The same issues raised in
environmental actions usually are repeated in managed care prosecutions.
These arguments posit that criminal penalties of environmental violations
are "unfair." In addition, prosecutors in these actions state that there is a
"vague sense of uneasiness" about prosecuting "less egregious"
environmental misconduct, that environmental law is unique and
environmental prosecutions are often politically motivated.
"The overriding objective in prosecuting environmental cases is
deterrence, and the government has sought to achieve this goal through
the use of increasingly strong sanctions.. .(where) the penalties are not
limited to fines."2°8 The basic premise behind an environmental crime is
that a violation, "ha[s] the potential to cause catastrophic harm to the
environment, public health, and local economies' ways of life."'
9
1907).
206. See id. at 131-32 (quoting Jones v. United States, F.2d 307, 310 (C.A.
D.C. 1962)).
207. Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 41 (1999).
208. See id. at 39-40.
209. Brickey, supra note 39, at 507.
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Moreover, "criminal enforcement (of environmental regulations) is
needed to protect the integrity of the regulatory scheme, prevent harm to
the environment, protect the public health and welfare, and to punish
culpable violations.,
210
The social and political evolution of environmental law is analogous to
that of MCO prosecutions. While environmental violations were, "[o]nce
viewed as mere economic/regulatory offenses lacking an element of moral
delicts... environmental crimes now provoke moral outrage and prompt
demands for severe sanctions and strict enforcement. ''211  Like
environmental violations, MCO conduct also provokes moral outrage as
well as demands for reform.2
Commonwealth v. Feinberg,"' a case cited by advocates of• - 214
environmental criminal penalties, is also instructive. The defendant, a
store owner, was convicted of manslaughter for selling a potentially lethal
strain of alcohol to patrons. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed
with the opinion of the lower court that the store owner was "grossly
negligent and demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for the
welfare of those whom he might reasonably have expected to use the
product for drinking purposes., 215  Thus, when managed care
organizations provide a level of health care they either know or should
reasonably know will cause harm, culpability should follow.
A managed care plan provider may be criminally liable as a corporation
for the illegal conduct of its employees if the employees are acting within
216the scope of their authority and their conduct benefits the corporation.
210. Id. at 509.
211. Id. at 489.
212. Democrats Introduce Patients' Bill of Rights, supra note 40, at *1.
Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) told the story of David Garvey of Illinois, whose
wife was diagnosed with aplastic anemia while on vacation in Hawaii and died
after her health maintenance organization insisted that she travel to Chicago for
treatment. Sen. Daschle said, "I am outraged by what happened to the Garveys
and believe we need legislation to protect patients against medically inappropriate
decisions by health plans that too often put the financial bottom line before
patients' health care needs." Id. See also Glodt, supra note 7, at 642.
213. 253 A.2d 636 (Pa. 1969).
214. Humphreys, supra note 29, at 336.
215. Feinberg, 253 A.2d at 642 (quoting the lower court's opinion).
216. See Joel M. Androphy et al., General Corporate Criminal Liability, 60
TEX. J. Bus. L. 121 (citing United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
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Moreover, criminal liability may be imposed on anyone in the
corporation, including executive officers and directors. 7
218In United States v. Park, a CEO of a grocery chain contested his
criminal conviction for violating the Food and Drug Act on the grounds
that he had delegated responsibility for the conduct that was subsequently
held to be illegal.1 9 The Supreme Court held that the probative inquiry
was not whether the defendant participated in the illegal conduct but
rather, whether he had a "responsible relationship" to the conduct.'2 The
Supreme Court stated that, "the Act imposes not only a positive duty to
seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a
duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not
occur." 
22 1
Similar to environmental actions, criminal prosecutions for Food and
Drug Act violations are also instructive. A Federal Court of Appeals
affirmed a conviction of a child psychiatrist for failing to maintain
222
required records of an experimental drug. Furthermore, a manufacturer
of a catheter was convicted of, inter alia, concealing adverse patient
223information from the FDA. The environmental and FDA criminal cases
are relevant to prospective criminal statutes for treatment denial decisions
because they are indicative of the legal support for statutes enacted to
protect the health, safety and welfare of citizens.
A final concern in developing criminal statutes is the proper level of
mens rea required to support a conviction. Should the statue merely
require knowledge of the action or knowledge of the wrongfulness of the
action?224 The Model Penal Code can serve as the foundation for this
analysis. In section 2.02: General Requirements of Culpability, the Model
Penal Code defines purposely, knowingly, recklessly and negligently.
22
217. Androphy, supra note 212, at 121.
218. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
219. See John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food &
Drug Prosecutions, 21 CHAMPION 20 (1997).
220. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
221. Id.
222. United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451 (8th Cir. 1994).
223. United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287 (D. Mass. 1994).
224. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. 741 F.2d 662, 664 (3rd Cir.
1984); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986);
Gaynor, supra note 203, at 58.
225. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
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The definitions of purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently and causal
relationship are as follows:
(a) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a
material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves
the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant
circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances
or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a
material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves
the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of
his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his
conduct will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a
material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of
the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
(d) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a
material element of an offense when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the
circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the
actor's situation.
Section 2.03: Causal Relationship Between Conduct and
Result Conduct is the cause of a result when:
(a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in
question would not have occurred; and
(b) the relationship between the conduct and the result
satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed
Tough Love
211
by the Code or by the law defining the offense.
While there are obvious hurdles with any MCO prosecution for
wrongful treatment denial decisions resulting in patient harm, there are
also prosecutorial weapons. "The stigma of an indictment, let alone a
conviction, should weigh heavily in the minds of corporate officials.,
2 7
Moreover, the prosecution may access and seize the records of MCOs.22a
"The Supreme Court has consistently held the Fifth Amendment privilege
is limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual
from compulsory incrimination through their own testimony or personal
[private] records.,
229
While MCO prosecutions could appear to be the second-guessing of
surgical decisions, criminal actions against MCOs should remain focused
on egregious instances of treatment denial decisions. Any MCO
prosecution, because of the subjective nature of health care, will be
difficult. Regardless of those difficulties, public safety, deterrence and
regulation of health care must guide legislators.
"A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic. "230
CONCLUSION
Clearly ERISA affords MCOs certain protection from civil litigation.
Just as clearly, MCOs have a profound impact on the health and well
being of the populace, arguably a greater impact than environmental
polluters. Current consumer protections, which include tort actions and
certain state legislation, are inadequate. Therefore, it is critical that tools
be developed to hold MCOs properly accountable. One such tool is
criminal prosecution. Although prosecutors could use certain existing
statutory and common law crimes to pursue managed care abuses, the
difficulty associated with defining medical necessity and establishing a
duty of care (in non-Medicare/Medicaid cases) dictates that the
226. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2), 2.03(1) (1962).
227. Stephen Longoria, The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental
Offenders: No Longer A Cost of Doing Business, 60 TEX. J. Bus. L. 1118, 1124
(1997).
228. Id. at 1124-25.
229. Id. at 1125 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944)).
230. Joseph Stalin available at www.top-education.com/SPEECHES/
JosephStalin.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2001).
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appropriate course is to create specific statutes proscribing treatment
denial decisions.
Legislators should focus on providing as much notice as possible by
drafting consistent, uniform standards of medically necessary care. This
will establish the MCO duty and avoid a patchwork of varying, and
possibly confusing, treatment standards. Moreover, legislators must also
determine the level of mens rea required to support a criminal conviction.
The inquiry into criminal statutes and administrative actions should be
considered with respect to, not only their lawfulness, but also to their
utility and value. Based on FDA, elder care and environmental
prosecutions, the enactment of health care criminal statutes that establish
a standard of medically necessary care and accompanying MCO
obligations will not only survive legal challenges, but will be the socially,
legally and morally correct path to take.
Finally, legislators must consider the political reality of criminal statutes
and the possibility that they may lose some managed care plans in their
state. As long as there are profits to be made in health care, MCOs will
continue to exist and modify their conduct accordingly.
